Buddy's Wearable Is Not Your Buddy:Privacy Implications of Pet Wearables by Van Der Linden, Dirk et al.
                          Van Der Linden, D., Zamansky, A., Hadar, I., Craggs, B., & Rashid, A.
(2019). Buddy's Wearable Is Not Your Buddy: Privacy Implications of Pet
Wearables. IEEE Security and Privacy, 17(3), 28-39. [8713279].
https://doi.org/10.1109/MSEC.2018.2888783
Peer reviewed version
Link to published version (if available):
10.1109/MSEC.2018.2888783
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via IEEE at https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8713279. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the
publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
Buddy’s wearable is not your buddy:
privacy implications of pet wearables
Dirk van der Linden1, Anna Zamansky2, Irit Hadar2, Barnaby Craggs1, and Awais Rashid1
1 Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, UK
dirk.vanderlinden,barney.craggs,awais.rashid@bristol.ac.uk
2 Department of Information Systems, University of Haifa, Israel
annazam,hadari@is.haifa.ac.il
Abstract. As an increasingly prevalent class of consumer device, pet wearables hold more privacy
implications than might at first be apparent. Whilst marketed as devices for pets, through analysis
of privacy policies we show that more data is captured about owners than pets – and what data is
captured remains vague.
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1 Introduction
One might be tempted to have assumed that consumers understand the privacy risk stem-
ming from the use of wearables. Research has shown that wearables are a major source of
privacy concern for their users [1], and data leaks are frequently reported in the media. For
example, standard (opt-out) tracking functionality enabled on FitBit devices shared into the
Strava app was recently confirmed to have led to a leakage of sensitive strategic informa-
tion [2]. Yet, research has also shown that perceived privacy risk has little correlation to
consumers’ intention to use wearables, let alone the perceived enjoyment of that use [3].
We focus on a potentially insidious threat to our privacy via a new class of seemingly
innocuous wearables: the pet wearable. Pet wearables, like other wearables, consist of two
distinct data gathering points: the actual wearable worn by the pet and the related software,
typically running on the owners’ phone and thus allowing for extensive data collection on
the owner. Figure 1 visualizes the key relations here. Unlike other wearables, the way pet
wearables are marketed to consumers focuses heavily on the pet-related functionality the
device provides (e.g., locating a missing pet, tracking walks) while making little mention
of whether, and to what extent, owners will have to give up their personal data as well to
use the accompanying software. Knowing that consumers are swayed by the rhetoric and
perceived benefits of wearables, with little thought o↵ered towards the potential risks of
their use [4], the way these devices are marketed is an important factor in their adoption
and use. If consumers of pet wearables are typically told, with almost exclusive focus, what
the wearable will measure of the pet, and how this information can be used to improve its
wellbeing, it may lull consumers into a false sense of security by understating that they are
the actual user of the product, and subsequently likely tracked as such.
In this paper, we show the privacy threat originating from pet wearable use by analyzing
their privacy policies to assess what data they are (not) known to capture. Our key findings
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Fig. 1. The context of a typical pet wearable: the wearable sends pet data to an app, which collects additional owner
data, and stores both somewhere’. This data is used to generate actionable information for the owner, who then takes
actions towards the pet. Pet data may indirectly reflect the pet’s immediate surroundings due to its interaction with,
or reaction to elements in those surroundings (e.g., third parties, being left home-alone, pet boarders).
include that some pet wearables do not consider the sensitive nature of pet data, are vague
in stating exactly what they track, seemingly track far more data of the owner than the pet
and that there is indeed a recurring mismatch between how pet wearables are marketed and
what data they are known to track. As a result, consumers need an unreasonable degree of
alertness to infer the extent of their personal data that may be unexpectedly and indirectly
captured.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 explores di↵erent privacy threats
following from pet wearables use. In Section 3 we analyze popular pet wearables currently
on the market and the data they are known to capture according to their privacy policy.
We discuss the consequences of these findings in Section 4, and further reflect on their
implications in Section 5. We conclude with recommendations in Section 6.
2 Pet wearables and privacy threats
The increasing use of pet wearables makes it important to understand what new privacy
threats their use brings. Knowing that humans typically co-exist with their pets in a close
relationship it is reasonable to assume that capturing data of a pet will reveal information on
the owner. Compare, for example, the notion of tracking a phone. In a TED Talk [5] in 2012,
Malte Spitz highlighted the extreme extent to which mobile telecommunications companies
log, track and utilize the meta-data that underpins this personal device usage. By tracking
the user’s mobile phone, the service provider was essentially without consent tracking Spitz’s
(and every other user’s) lives and breaching privacy. It is now widely understood that tracking
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a mobile phone is tantamount to tracking its users, because of the relationship between
the user and the phone. Tracking of pet data, similarly, may reveal a detailed picture of
their owners’ habits and whereabouts. To complicate matters, an owner in this sense may
practically be more than a single person. For example, di↵erent family members interacting
with their pet, an incidental dog or cat sitter, or even a veterinarian – all may be reflected
in the pet’s data. Exactly whose personal data the pet data may reveal thus becomes an
additional concern.
?
Threat: Ambiguous scope of data collection
Mitigation: Regulation of marketing and 
advertisement communication
Threat: (in)direct third party observation
Mitigation: Regulation of permissible 
communication tech in public and third 
party space
Threat: Data sharing with third parties
Mitigation: Enforcement of data protection 
standards
…
aggravates…
 >
< …aggravates…
Affected: Third party 
Threat vector: Pet data 
Impact: Violation of privacy, 
inability of disinformation
Affected: Owner 
Threat vector: Privacy policy 
Impact: Inability to assess 
privacy and safety threats 
Affected: Owner 
Threat vector: Privacy policy 
Impact: Inability to assert 
control over data(’s impact) 
Threat: indirect owner observation
Mitigation: Privacy controls offering clearer 
insight into what data may reveal
Affected: Owner 
Threat vector: Pet data 
Impact: Violation of privacy
Fig. 2. Data privacy threats of pet wearables: the ambiguous scope of data collection, and (in)direct third party
observation allowed by these products aggravate the common threat of data sharing with third parties.
Many pet wearables use accelerometers to capture activity data of pets, which allows for
the deduction of complex behavior. Ladha et al. [6] presented a classification system that
can deduce sixteen advanced canine behaviors and poses such as shaking, shivering, sni ng,
digging – all of which may be in response to outside stimuli. ‘Mere’ accelerometer data of
a dog thus has the opportunity to be classified into a detailed account of physical context
a dog was in – out for walks at specific times in the morning and evening, playing in the
afternoon, napping at some other times. Such information could be used to build profiles on
pet owners, with implications ranging from burglars knowing when to approach a home, to
insurance companies inferring health profiles of pet owners via their dog’s activity. Pet data
itself, thus, may contain very sensitive information with the strong potential for privacy
intrusions, allowing for consumer’s fear “of certain data, when combined, having critical
implications.” [1]
This is all the more concerning as research has argued that many datasets captured by
wearables cannot be realistically (considered) de-identified or pseudonymised because sensor
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data (from e.g., accelerometers) is typically unique to individuals, as well as rich enough to
allow for relatively straightforward re-identification [7].
In an ongoing project, we have recently concluded a study with 81 users of a canine
activity tracker (FitBark), eliciting any concerns on the use of the device participants may
have had, as well as what aspects of these devices were important to them. Amongst oth-
ers, we asked users how important they found the device’s accuracy, consistency, usability,
maintainability, scalability, its look and feel, and its security (explained as its ability to
preventing information leakage about your dog or you). Security came just-before-last, with
only 53% of users finding it important to some extent, 26% being neutral and 21% finding
it not important. In contrast, most other aspects were considered important by over 75% of
the participants. More telling were the results of open questions asking participants to detail
any concerns they have had in their use of the device. A myriad of concerns were elicited
– from the ergonomics of the device, to its accuracy, to its poor waterproofing. Yet, not a
single participant expressed any concerns about their privacy. This may very well indicate
that users are not aware of the potential threats to their privacy – in line with what we focus
on in this paper, namely how these devices are marketed as measuring ‘only’ a pet, not their
owner.
What we did come across in this study were examples of pet owners using these devices
to derive real-world information of third parties from the pet wearable’s data. Some of these
examples are rather innocuous, such as a person who used the activity patterns of their dog
to show it was sleeping during the times that a neighbor mistakenly (or maliciously) issued
noise complaints claiming the dog was barking incessantly. In this case data is simply used
to (in)validate claims about the actual subject of the measurements: the dog.
However, in other cases users noted interpreting these patterns to infer information about
third parties. For example, a di↵erent participant described going on business trips regularly
and leaving their dog with a dedicated dog sitter, with whom they had an agreement for the
exercise goals their dog should achieve while with them. Noting the dog’s restlessness on their
return, they looked at the recorded activity patterns and saw that the exercise was not met,
and on further analysis inferred that the dog moved so little, and so di↵erent from its regular
patterns, that they had likely been confined to a cage by the dog sitter. This poses a rather
unexpected turn: instead of malicious users compromising the users’ privacy via attacks, the
users themselves potentially compromise the privacy of third parties by interpreting changes
in patterns of the wearable’s data and associating them with hypothesized actions by that
third party. Such indirect observation challenges a key requirement for privacy, namely that
people should maintain overall control of their data and its release [8], as well as having
to explicitly agree to being tracked. Given these scenarios where pet owners have used a
wearable’s data to actively infer information about a third party, it is all the more striking
they do not seem concerned with similar privacy threats targeted towards them
The key privacy threats discussed above are summarized in Fig. 2, mapped onto the
context of pet wearables as shown in Fig. 1. To understand to what extent consumers are
exposed to these and potential other threats, we first need to understand what devices are
currently on the market, and most importantly, what (extent of) data they can be said to
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capture. It seems prudent, thus, to investigate what data pet wearables are known to capture,
and to reflect on the more pressing question: what privacy implications does this hold?
3 Market reality: what data do pet wearables capture?
3.1 Wearables on the market
There are many pet wearables available, from o cial and reseller channels, to seemingly
deserted crowdfunder pages. Because no systematic survey or listing of pet wearables is cur-
rently available, for purposes of this work we made a (non-exhaustive) selection of products
by searching for website and blog posts discussing popular pet wearable products. We in-
cluded pet wearables if their website had a product available for purchase or pre-order, and
o↵ered at least a basic description of functionality, technology, and privacy policy. Table 1
presents an overview of the selected products and their core functionality.
Table 1. Overview of selected pet wearables products, noting (known) data capturing sensors and connectivity.
Device Origin Made for Type Interface Sensor(s) Connectivity
FitBark US Dogs Activity and sleep 
tracker
App, Web 3-axis accelerometer Bluetooth
Garmin DeltaSmart US Dogs Obedience 
trainer, activity 
tracker
App not stated Bluetooth
Jagger & Lewis France Dogs Health tracker App 9-axis accelerometer, microphone Bluetooth, Wifi
Kippy Italy Dogs Activity and 
location tracker
App, Web GPS/LBS Machine to machine 
(M2m), network cells
Kyon Cyprus Dogs Location tracker App 9-axis accelerometer, gyroscope, 
magnetometer, temperature 
sensor, altimeter, GPS
Bluetooth, GPRS/3G
Link AKC US Dogs Activity and 
location tracker
App 3-axis accelerometer, GPS Bluetooth, Wifi, cellular 
data (AT&T)
Nuzzle US Dogs, Cats Activity and 
location tracker
App GPS Bluetooth, GPRS/3G
Paby US Dogs, Cats Activity and 
location tracker
App GPS/LBS Wifi, 3G-WCDMA
PawTrack UK Cats Location tracker App, Web GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, Beacon 
tracking
Wifi, GPRS
PetPace US Dogs, Cats Health tracker App "non-invasive sensors" "low power, long range 
communication"
PitPat UK Dogs Activity tracker App 3-axis accelerometer Bluetooth
Poof (bean/pea) US Dogs, Cats Activity, sleep, 
and location 
tracker
App 3-axis accelerometer Bluetooth
Scollar US Dogs, Cats Activity and 
location tracker
App microphone (Scollar trek), GPS Bluetooth, Wifi, RF
TabCat UK Cats Location tracker Hardware - RF-based
TractiveGPS Austria Dogs Location tracker App GPS, GSM Bluetooth
TractiveMOTION Austria Dogs Location tracker App accelerometer, motion detection 
sensor, temperature sensor, 
brightness sensor
Bluetooth
Whistle US Dogs Activity tracker App 3-axis accelerometer, GPS, 
GLONASS
Bluetooth, Wifi, GPRS/3G
WonderWoof US Dogs Activity tracker App 3-axis accelerometer Bluetooth
WÜF US Dogs Activity and 
location tracker
App accelerometer, GPS, microphone 
(conflicting mentions)
Bluetooth, GPRS/3G
Most pet wearables are described as activity and/or location trackers, and with the sole
exception of TabCat, all devices typically require the owner to install companion mobile apps
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in order to fully use the device. The technology used to subsequently exchange data from the
wearable device to the owner’s mobile phone is of additional interest, as there is widespread
use of Bluetooth, which is still open to multiple attack vectors for data interception [9].
Bluetooth tra c analysis of common fitness trackers has been shown to allow for observation
of current activity, and more critically, a user’s gait (i.e., their manner of moving), thereby
allowing for identification of the observed user [10]. Pet wearables are similarly vulnerable
to such analysis, in particular gait analysis, due to the wider breed diversity of dogs making
it more straightforward to correlate di↵erent gaits with smaller samples of potential dogs.
This is a concrete example of the re-identification challenge of sensor data as mentioned
earlier, making it feasible to identify pets (and their owners) even in aggregate data sets.
Depending on the extent of additional data linked to pets, this may hold significant privacy
implications.
3.2 Privacy policy analysis of data captured by pet wearables
For each device, we systematically determined what data they capture of the pet and its
owner, detailed in Tables 2 and 3. We first captured a snapshot of each device’s publicly
available privacy policy. The analysis was performed by two of the authors, who manually
extracted the data mentioned in each policy’s section on data collection, resulting in a list
of terms. This was then iterated over in order to reduce trivial synonyms (e.g., “log in”
and “login” being the same). Any terms where it was ambiguous as to what exactly was
captured, and whether di↵erent terms would relate to the same data (e.g., “activity data” and
“exercise data”) were left separate. We only considered data collected by the service/devices
themselves, not any data collected by third parties such as e.g., Poof’s ability to link the
wearable to a Facebook account, which would result in an increased scope of data collection.
The final set of terms describing captured data was then verified against each privacy policy,
noting whether the policy explicitly mentioned capturing such data. Inter-rater reliability
was established via Cohen’s kappa, with rating for classification of human data  = 0.93 and
classification of animal data  = 0.95, both indicating ‘very good’ strength of agreement.
This process was first performed in December 2017 and repeated in June 2018 to assess
whether the coming into force of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) prompted
any policy updates, and, potentially, additional clarification on captured data. Only six
devices seem to have had their privacy policy updated since, or close before the GDPR came
into force. Those with no updated policies typically have a last modified date (if available)
between 2015 and 2017. Several policies lacking a last modified date are out of date regardless,
stating compliance with now superseded legislation such as the Data Protection Act 1998,
the precursor to the UK’s GDPR implementation.
Even though pets are ostensibly the intended users of these wearables, Table 2 shows
there is little explicit information on what (if any) data the products capture. Most pet
wearables leave things implicit, or use aggregate concepts such as ‘activity data,’ rather than
specifying exactly what is captured. For example, while it would be obvious to most that a
wearable stores a pet’s name, only three explicitly denote so. We emphasized the mismatch
between wearables claiming to track activity, but not explicating what kind of activity data
6
Table 2. Pet data (not) known to be captured by each wearable. A Xor † indicates the policy explicitly mentions
capturing this data, noted in the first and second analysis, respectively. Empty cells indicate the policy does not
explicitly mention capturing this data. A ? indicates an important mismatch, lacking detail on activity or location
data in devices with such functionality. Devices highlighted in yellow are not covered by a post-GDPR privacy policy.
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FitBark 3 √ √ †
Garmin DeltaSmart 0 ?
Jagger & Lewis 2 √ √
Kippy 0
Kyon 2 √ √
Link AKC 5 √ √ ? √ √ √
Nuzzle 0 ? ?
Paby 4 √ √ √ √
PawTrack 0 ?
PetPace 4 √ √ √ √
PitPat 14 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Poof (bean/pea) 0 ? ?
Scollar 0 ? ?
TabCat 0 ?
TractiveGPS 1 † ?
TractiveMOTION 1 † ?
Whistle 4 √ √ √ √
WonderWoof 1 √ ?
WÜF 3 √ √ √
Note that cells remaining empty or ? are informational – while data is not known to be captured, in many cases it
likely is, such as a pet’s name, breed, weight, all of which may constitute (sets of) personally identifying information.
Their lack of explicit mention in policies thus becomes important to note, as such data is likely not addressed under
requirements for personal data processing (e.g., encrypted storage, limitation of transfer).
they capture (shown as empty orange cells), and wearables claiming to track location of pets,
but not explicating what kind of location data they capture (shown as empty red cells).
When we switch our attention to what data is captured of owners, more (and certainly
more diverse) data is captured. Table 3 shows the extent of owner’s (personal) data captured.
Here, as well, we marked wearables claiming to track pet location – and thus likely owner
location by proxy, but not explicating what kind of location data they capture (shown as
empty red cells).
Two points require further analysis. First and foremost, what implications the capturing
of particular data by each wearable has. To what extent (and perhaps, why) do some pet
wearables capture personal data of the owner such as their gender, location, or hobbies
and interests? Second, and perhaps more urgent, what implications does the lack of explicit
7
Table 3. Owner data additionally known to be captured by the use of each wearable. Markings and colors have the
same semantics as in Table 2.
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FitBark 7 √ † √ √ † † †
Garmin DeltaSmart 4 √ √ √ √
Jagger & Lewis 3 √ √ √
Kippy 0 ?
Kyon 8 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Link AKC 17 √ ? √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Nuzzle 4 √ √ √ √
Paby 10 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
PawTrack 5 √ ? √ √ √ √
PetPace 1 √
PitPat 15 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Poof (bean/pea) 3 √ √ √
Scollar 20 √ √ √ ? √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
TabCat 0 ?
TractiveGPS 9 † † † † † † † † √
TractiveMOTION 9 † † † † † † † † √
Whistle 14 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
WonderWoof 12 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
WÜF 10 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
You Device Content Use of the service
mention in privacy policies whether data is captured have? The sheer number of empty cells
in both Tables 2 and 3 indicate that consumers will be at a loss for reasonably inferring to
what extent their privacy may be at stake.
4 Discussion: concerns for the use of pet wearables
In this section we discuss several concerns specific to pet wearables that arise from the above
findings. This does not imply these are the only (privacy related) concerns, as well known
general issues are equally as problematic here, and may in fact exacerbate them – such as data
access, (e.g., WU¨F’s privacy policy noting that “[collected data] is generally not available to
customers for their own, direct access.”), and data removal (e.g., PawTrack’s inserting of a
conditional “where appropriate” clause to any personal data modification requests).
Mismatch between how products are marketed and what data they track. There
is a mismatch between product marketing and their data collection in two ways: on the one
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hand they capture more than one would expect, and on the other hand they do not detail
capturing key data one would expect being captured, such as location by a location tracker
device.
To describe the first kind of mismatch, we direct attention to those devices which are
explicitly marketed as being activity or fitness trackers with no location tracking capabilities,
but, through the use of its necessary related app, end up tracking their owners’ location
regardless. For example, WonderWoof is marketed to consumers stating, among others,
“the WonderWoof BowTie does not have GPS and does not track your dog’s location in
real time.” However, the location of the human user is tracked, as can be seen in Table 3.
As argued before, due to the close relationship between humans and their pets, specifically
dogs, this practically means that the location of a dog wearing this device is tracked during
a big part of the day.
This is not the only device to do so. PitPat, for example, similarly answers a frequently
asked question whether the device tracks dogs’ location by “No, PitPat is an activity mon-
itor (walking, running, sleeping, playing etc) and does not have GPS.” Yet, similarly, the
accompanying software does track the location of the human user. Knowing that PitPat
explicitly claims to have business partners in areas such as “pet insurance; pet food/ supple-
ments/pharmaceuticals; veterinary care; retail; academic and other research,” the location
of dogs and their owners may indeed be valuable data that owners are not aware of being
used in such a way.
Post-GDPR the capture of location data remains one of the better examples of ambiguity
as to whose data is captured. Tractive’s privacy policy details that they do, indeed, capture
location. However, it states only: “GPS position of the user’s mobile device (for showing the
user position on the map)” But what of the GPS of the pet wearable itself? Surely this is to
be shown on a map as well, for example to find a lost pet. No such mention is made, even
though a dog will typically be in close proximity to its owner, making tracking the dog’s
location equally as privacy sensitive as tracking a mobile phone. To further confuse matters,
the policy does note that the purpose of its data processing includes “track[ing] your pet’s
location” – without detailing that they actually capture the data to do so.
A rare positive example can be found in Kyon’s policy, which seems to understand and
warn users of the potentially sensitive nature of pet location data: “the location of your
KYON tracking collar and base station, geo-fence information which may disclose the loca-
tion of your residence or other locations personal to you”.
The second kind of mismatch is a lack of clarity as to whether expected data is captured
or not. Tables 2 and 3 show those devices marketed as activity and/or location trackers
which do not explicate what, or the extent of, such data is captured. This makes it di cult
to verify the extent of data collected, and what information may be deduced from it. For
example, PawTrack is marketed as “the world’s most advanced cat tracking system,” boasting
incorporating Gallileo, Glonass and GPS, making it possible to track a cat where ever they
are. Yet, regardless of all the sensors the device contains and the potential data collection it
performs there is not a single mention of location in its privacy policy. As a result, it is not
possible to establish whether location data is captured constantly, intermittently, and so on.
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The TractiveGPS pet tracker similarly markets itself as a GPS tracker enabling tracking the
exact location of a pet, and uses boasts “LIVE tracking,” but, again, does not elaborate in
its privacy policy on the extent of location data captured.
Key finding: looking at a pet wearable’s functionality is not enough for a user to feasibly
assess the kinds and extent of data it captures.
Di↵erences in whether pet data is classified as personal data. Some devices implic-
itly acknowledge the sensitive nature of data collected from pets by mentioning it as personal
data collected. For example, FitBark notes that personal information includes “your dog’s
profile and activity information.” Some devices remain vague on the matter, especially when
they do not list any data captured, as will be discussed below. However, one wearable stands
out from its contrasting position. The privacy policy of PetPace explicitly states:
“Pets’ Data is non-identifiable nor shall be considered as personal information.”
As argued before, because in the use of pet wearables the collection of human data and
animal data are integrated and processed by a single device, there is very little reason to
assume the animal data does not have a relation to an identifiable natural person.
Key finding: some pet wearables do not consider the sensitive nature of pet data
captured via pet wearables.
Unclear extent of what animal data is stored (and inferred) In line with findings
that privacy policies are rife with vague and unclear language [11], we encountered two types
of concerns where consumers cannot be sure of the extent of data collected by the wearable.
First, several devices do not state at all what (personal) data is collected, such as the
Garmin DeltaSmart, Kippy, Nuzzle, PawTrack, Poof, Scollar, and TabCat. This is a concern
because we cannot infer whether animal data that is collected by the device is considered as
personal data or not. For example, the Garmin privacy policy states that personal informa-
tion is “information that, either alone or in combination with other information collected,
identifies an individual.” This would reasonably include most, if not all, animal data. Yet, as
also shown above, not all device manufacturers would agree with this interpretation, making
it impossible to determine to what extent animal data is suitably protected.
Second, several devices describe what data is collected in terms of combined or aggregate
concepts. For example, FitBark, Jagger & Lewis, Kyon, Paby, PetPace, WU¨F all use concepts
such as ‘pet profile’ or ‘activity data’ to describe what animal data is gathered, rather than
detailing this to exact data. This is of concern because one cannot infer how critical the
animal data collected is. Nonetheless, several of such devices do note the sensitive nature of
animal data, such as Paby, which notes that personal information processed by the device
includes the pet’s ‘activity data’ and its ‘activity goals’.
This has not abated in the policies updated since the advent of the GDPR, from FitBark
adding that they capture “your dog’s health and behavioral information,” without detailing
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what that information is, or the updated policy for TractiveGPS and TractiveMOTION
referring to the notion of “pet related data,” which is only defined as: “. . . allows to draw
conclusions about the pet owner (e.g. pet chip id).” This lack of transparency gives little
information as to exactly what pet information is captured, and to what extent it may identify
the pet’s owner. This makes it di cult for owners to assess whether they are comfortable
with the wearable’s data capture, let alone understand how much their privacy is potentially
at risk.
Key finding: consumers cannot be sure of the exact data that is collected and stored
by their pet wearable.
5 Implications: what are the key privacy threats that need to be
dealt with?
5.1 The extent of personal data captured by pet wearables is seemingly
misrepresented
When a device is marketed as solely an activity tracker, and makes several mentions (in e.g.,
product descriptions, and o cial FAQs) that they do not include GPS, and do not track the
pet’s location, it is absolutely reasonable for a consumer not actually wearing the device to
infer that normal use of the wearable would not track their, or their pet’s location. However,
as shown in Table 3 this is not always the case. This holds not only for location, but also
other sensitive personal data, where it is not reasonable for the consumer to assume such
information would be tracked and stored.
Compare this to the scenario, discussed above, of unintentional data leakage via FitBit
and Strava. In that case, military personnel tracked their exercise routes and data, and
knowingly uploaded it to a third party service which specifically mentioned using any such
data. In such cases it can be argued that users could reasonably have understood the privacy
risk, given the known sensitivity of the data. However, what of such scenarios when one
is not aware of the extent of personal data gathered by the devices which does not seem
reasonable? Why would someone expect their location to be also tracked if uploading e.g.,
animal data of a device noted not to have GPS, nor track the animal’s location? Moreover,
one cannot feasibly infer whether data is sensitive if aggregates such as “activity data” or
“pet profile” are used – all of which may, for example, include (indirect) location estimates.
Better protection of consumers is needed by ensuring that devices whose key data cap-
turing subject is a person, do not market themselves as targeting an entirely di↵erent entity,
the pet.
5.2 Consumers and third parties are potentially at risk due to the lack of
classification of animal data’s status as personal data
If companies explicitly classify collected animal data as not personally identifiable, and there-
fore not protected under relevant data protection clauses, such data is at risk. Several devices
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avoid mentioning animal data as personal data, or use aggregate concepts that make it di -
cult to assess exactly what data is protected. This poses a risk towards users of pet wearables
due to the potential of inferring sensitive data of the human from the pet’s data.
Such risks are known and well studied, such as the tracking of mobile phones now being
equated with tracking their owner. Research has shown other contexts in which personal data
could be inferred from seemingly non-personal data, such as deriving the specific train route
someone travels by from patterns in their phone’s vibration energy harvesting system [12].
Because the human-animal companionship between owners and their pets is well known, any
animal data should be carefully assessed for its potential to indirectly reveal identity or other
information about the related human.
The examples given in Section 2 make it clear that even if there are no well-known cases
of owner’s privacy being violated by pet data, they themselves already use this data to infer
information about third parties from the data captured of their pets. This raises further
discussions on how to interpret such data (and how to agree on such interpretations), as in
the absence of certification schemes for accuracy of wearables, inaccurate data may lead one
to misjudge a third party’s behavior. In the earlier dog sitter scenario, what would happen if
the wearable’s classification algorithms were not optimal and misclassified the dog’s behavior
– leading the owner to accuse a third party of malicious behavior, with false, but hard to
repudiate proof?
Moreover, an increasing number of pet wearable manufacturers are entering into collab-
orations with larger corporations. For example, Whistle was recently incorporated into the
Mars Petcare veterinary health group which includes a significant number of third parties
in pet nutrition, healthcare, and insurance.Vodafone recently incorporated Kippy into the
V by Vodafone range of services which tracks consumers’ pets, children, cars, and other
possessions.While such integration is ostensibly for direct consumer functionality and wider
social benefit (e.g., improving pet healthcare), as a result large datasets incorporating data
of pet wearables may become available to a wide range of third parties.
This shows the need to explicitly protect animal data as personal data, both to protect
people from having their personal data compromised by malicious attackers, as well as those
same people unintentionally opening themselves up to liability by unknowingly compromising
the privacy of others by deriving personal data on them through their pet’s data.
6 Conclusion
This article has shown that pet wearables on the market engage in extensive data collection
of their human owners typically capturing far more data of the owner via the accompanying
software than of the pet itself and tend to be vague on the extent of pet data collected all of
which may be sensitive and lead to the identification of people the pet has interacted with.
We argue that consumers are led into underestimating the extent of personal data collected,
and that they may be at risk due to the denial of pet data’s status as personal data.
With the increase of strict data privacy laws being passed around the world, and the
now active enforcement of the GDPR – applicable to any company processing data of EU
citizens, it seems particularly timely to stimulate a discussion on what extent of pet wearable
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data is personal data, and how it should be suitably protected. Comparing our findings with
the GDPR’s key principles for personal data processing:
Mismatch between how products are marketed and what data they track: capturing
more data than expected violates the principle of data minimization which requires the
capture of personal data to be not only adequate and relevant, but also limited to what
is necessary.
Di↵erences in whether pet data is classified as personal data: actively denying pet
data being personal data or doing so implicitly by not detailing any captured pet data
in privacy policies violates the key definition of personal data: any information relating
to an identified or identifiable natural person, especially because these devices typically
capture direct personal identifiers (i.e., the owner’s details).
Unclear extent of what data is stored (and inferred): the lack of detail on what data
is captured, or the use of ambiguous aggregate concepts violates the principle of trans-
parency which requires clear and plain language regarding what data is captured, and
what the consequences of processing that data will be.
Implementing privacy controls could mitigate some of these concerns, by giving consumers
clearer insight into what data is captured and allowing them to opt-out of non-vital data
capture (i.e., much of the data in Table 3). More complicated, however, is the matter of
stored pet data reflecting personal data not only of its owner, but of other people with
whom the pet interacts. Privacy controls, through nudging [13], could be a solution for third
parties knowingly interacting with the pet, such as a family member while pet-sitting. They
could install the wearable’s app and be given temporary access to privacy controls by the pet
owner while in the vicinity of the pet, so that while pet-sitting they would maintain control
over the extent of data captured.
However, third parties that do not knowingly interact with the pet could not feasibly do
so. To protect their right to privacy, a combination of policy and responsible use, informing
the owner via nudges seems a more viable solution. For example, nudges could describe
the potential consequences that processing of this data may have – “you’re in public now:
your dog’s activity data may disclose information on others it interacts with!” Rather than
relegate such warnings to privacy policies that go unread by most consumers, using nudges
when using relevant functionality would go a long way in ensuring consumers realize the
potential impact of using these wearables.
As manufacturers of pet wearables on the market di↵er in their views towards pet data,
from acknowledging its sensitive nature and ability to identify people to outright denying
it (with most manufacturers seemingly avoiding an explicit stance on the debate), we call
for explicit discussion and policy towards the secure treatment of pet data. We need more
insights to understand what pet data (or combinations thereof) can be considered personal
data, when and how it can be shared or transferred to new or other owners, and how we can
protect the impact such data has on both pet owners and third parties whose behavior and
actions may be indirectly reflected in such data.
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